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The concept of clientelism has lost descriptive power. It has become indistinguishable from 
neighboring concepts and is applied across analytical levels. Using Gerring’s (1999) 
characterization of a ‘good’ concept, I establish the core attributes of clientelism, which, in 
addition to being an interest-maximizing exchange, involves longevity, diffuseness, face-to-face 
contact, and inequality. Using secondary sources and fieldwork data, I differentiate clientelism 
from concepts such as vote-buying and corruption and determine its analytical position at the 
microsociological level. I argue that labeling sociopolitical systems as clientelistic is awkward 
since, operating at a higher analytical level, they have characteristics beyond microsociological 
clientelism and they affect the political nature of the clientelism they contain. I conclude that 
differentiating clientelism confining it to the microsociological level will aid theory-building. 





The vast literature on clientelism is marked by the struggle to explain the difference 
between the formal, impersonal and universally applicable channels and institutions that are 
identified with democracy in theory – and ostensibly implanted in practice – and the more 
personalized exchanges (ranging from benign to sinister) that occur in real politics, all efforts to 
eliminate them to the contrary. Searching for the causes and effects of these exchanges is crucial 
to understanding political realities and to improving the development and practical application of 
theoretical ideals. However, the concept misformation (to cite Sartori 1970) or – more aptly, in 
this case, – deformation that has occurred in the evolution of research into clientelism does not 
aid the cause. 
Contemporary research on clientelism has its roots in 1960s and 1970s sociological and 
anthropological studies of traditional societies. Originally considered as an intricate personal 
relationship involving norms of reciprocity between two individuals engaged in the exchange of 
goods and services, clientelism has gradually come to be applied to a broad variety of political 
exchanges. Social scientists began to observe behavior like that described by the traditional 
clientelism in activities linking agricultural villages to central markets; representing villages and 
urban slums in central politics; and facilitating the exchange of information and resources, 
negotiation of policy, and filling of positions in political and governmental institutions. The 
desire to describe these phenomena and to compare their significance across historical periods 
and geographical as well as hierarchical space caused a broadening use of the term clientelism. 
However, discarding or altering characteristics defining the traditional clientelism has 
voided the concept of descriptive power in a result opposed to the desired effect. Despite calls for 
specification (Graziano 1976, 1983), the problem persists. Some researchers continue to use 
clientelism to indicate diffuse, long-term interactions involving shows of personal concern and 
liking between the parties involved; others label it an interest-maximizing exchange of goods and 
services and apply it to incidents ranging from vote-buying to pork-barreling; some use it to label 
organizations and political systems; and yet others use it with little explanation of what it is 
intended to convey. Clientelism is no longer clearly differentiated from neighboring terms, 
making it a poor concept difficult to operationalize and to use for theory-building (see Gerring 
1999). 
The goal of this article is to identify the core attributes of clientelism and the analytical 
level at which it operates. In addition to being an exchange in which individuals maximize their 
interests, clientelism involves longevity, diffuseness, face-to-face contact, and inequality. That is, 
it is a lasting personal relationship between individuals of unequal sociopolitical status. 
Establishing these characteristics facilitates differentiation from concepts such as vote-buying 
and corruption and determines clientelism’s analytical position at the microsociological level. 
Clientelism can be contained in meso and macrosociological organizations and structures, but the 
latter are more complex than clientelism. In fact, the internal form of clientelism varies partially 
with external, macrosociological structures – being more democratic or authoritarian depending 
on the levels of competition and participation in the system – making the labeling of a system as 
clientelistic per se awkward. 
To be sure, analytical categories and levels are not airtight. Empirical cases will often 
cross the line between categories and levels, combining characteristics (Smelser 1997). The 
separation between theoretical abstraction and empirical complexity does not, however, render 
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the exercise of generalization unproductive. It provides a heuristic starting point from which to 
undertake empirical research and to organize comparative study. 
Some guidelines for concept creation 
Sartori’s (1970) and Collier and Mahon’s (1993) are among the most widely cited 
analyses of concept building in political science. According to Sartori’s ‘classical’ approach, a 
primary, general category should be used for the higher level of abstraction and a series of 
secondary categories that include all of the primary category’s characteristics and add further 
elements that are present in particular cases. Collier and Mahon describe two further methods of 
categorization that allow for more slack in concept building and application. Radial categories 
are characterized by a central, primary category, representing a Weberian ideal type, and a 
number of secondary categories that branch out from the primary definition. The secondary 
categories share one or some of the primary characteristics, but divide the rest, so that each 
branch may have relatively little in common with the others. In family resemblance categories, 
defining attributes do not have clear boundaries: the category describes a series of cases quite 
well although there may not be any one characteristic that is shared by all members. 
 Despite their popularity, these are only three among innumerable positions on concept 
formation in language, philosophy, history and the social sciences. The variation of possibilities 
is such that one might give up, with the justification that all concepts depend on their context. 
However, Gerring (1999) argues that this challenge should motivate analysts neither to surrender 
nor to attempt to follow a strictly rule-based approach, but to find an acceptable balance among 
the desirable aspects of a good concept. A concept should be catchy, intuitively clear, and hold to 
the established characteristics with which it is associated. It should be expressed according to a 
core characteristic, on which secondary characteristics depend, and be easily identifiable with its 
empirical manifestations. At the same time, the concept must be clearly differentiated from those 
that surround it, have enough depth of non-essential characteristics to make it richly descriptive, 
and be of some use for theory building. 
The concept of clientelism fails on depth and differentiation in much of the literature, as 
we will see in the next section, making it difficult to use for theory building. 
Stretching clientelism 
 Reciprocal, exchange-based relationships have existed in traditional and modern 
sociopolitical settings. Based on kinship, community, and/or access to resources, they have 
ensured survival in agrarian subsistence and primitive trading societies, social integration and 
mobility where political centers are geographically or structurally removed from the periphery, 
lubrication of inefficient or ineffective bureaucratic agencies, passing of knowledge and 
positions, and so on. These relationships are not necessarily efficient or effective at all times but, 
for reasons ranging from tradition through socioeconomic structure to relative ease of 
application, often exist where rational, impersonal, bureaucratic structures would seem more 
appropriate. Despite the different settings in which these exchanges take place and the varying 
content of the relationships, they have generally been labeled or defined as clientelism. 
 In the social sciences, the study of clientelism gained popularity during the development 
era, as sociologists and anthropologists studied traditional societies, analyzing kinship, 
community, and landlord-peasant relationships. Links between peasants and local chiefs or 
landlords were described as patron-client links, with the terms patronage and clientelism being 
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relatively interchangeable. From these studies arose a commonly accepted definition of 
clientelism that would form the base for future research. According to this definition, clientelism 
involves a long-term relationship between two people of unequal status who have relatively 
regular personal interactions. They exchange goods and services whose value is objectively non-
comparable – the higher status person having access to goods and services of a higher market 
value than the lower status person who can generally offer only political support or labour – but 
whose importance to the receiving party makes the interaction worthwhile. The relationship 
covers a broad range of goods and services that are generally not reciprocated immediately, 
making it difficult to know whether the parties are even and adding to the longevity of the bond. 
Though the terms of the agreement are not rooted in law, both parties understand their obligation 
to reciprocate and that disappointing the other’s expectations may lead to a breaking off of the 
relationship (see, for example, Landé 1977; Scott 1977; Mintz and Wolf 1977; Eisenstadt and 
Roniger 1984). 
 In essence, peasants in need of resources (land, seeds, tools and credit, technical or legal 
advice and dispute mediation) or protection from vagabonds sought out relationships with 
powerful figures within their own community or the landed elite, in the hope that these 
individuals would become personal benefactors. In return for access to needed resources, the 
peasant provided labour, gifts, deference, shows of affection, and political support to the patron, 
enhancing the latter’s status. Such relationships were built on mutual trust that the other party 
would fulfill his obligations and generally endured over long periods of time covering any 
number and type of exchange.    
 A much-debated aspect of such relationships is their voluntarism. Voluntarism constitutes 
– both in fact and in definition – a significant internal contradiction of patron-client relationships 
(Roniger 1990). Since such interactions are not ruled by law, they cannot be legally enforced. 
Clients are, theoretically, free to choose their patrons and free to exit the relationship should it 
not be to their satisfaction (Gouldner 1977). At the same time, many studies of patron-client links 
have exposed their exploitative nature. Some of these emanate from the structuralist camps, with 
researchers arguing that a clientelistic relationship may well appear to the individual client to 
fulfill his need, but clientelism as such is a mechanism of social control that serves to undermine 
horizontal class relations and allow the elite to maintain its grasp on power (Singelmann 1981). 
Others come from diverse research schools and point to the fact that seemingly voluntary 
clientelistic relationships have often been backed by the threat of repression or withdrawal of 
resources should the clients fail to comply with the patron’s wishes (Auyero 1999; Fox 1994). 
The degree of voluntarism is, thus, probably related directly to the size of the client's resource 
base and/or access to alternative patrons – that is, to his relative power vis-à-vis the patron. 
 A common element among social scientists studying clientelism was the tendency to see 
this as a traditional relationship that would disappear as society modernized and professionalized 
state agencies began to redistribute resources and ensure security based on impersonal 
regulations, eliminating the need for private arrangements with patrons. It was thus contrary to 
all expectations that central administrative structures and markets in fact connected with 
traditional sectors in the countryside through an interface mirroring clientelism. Local 
strongmen, businessmen and professionals now traded their expertise in the rules of the external 
world with local clients, while party machines developed to reach voters in the countryside and 
in urban slums and savvy patrons acquired official positions with access to state resources. 
Analysts found reciprocal, exchange-based relationships in various instances at all levels of 
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sociopolitical organization, and began to use the often-interchangeable terms clientelism, 
patronage, and patron-clientelism to describe them all. 
 Some of these terminological reapplications are accompanied by detailed specifications 
of differences and by additions of adjectives to identify phenomena more or less closely related 
to the traditional definition of clientelism. For example, Cornelius (1977) discusses the increase 
in autonomy and decrease in affectivity found in clientelistic relationships in Mexican urban 
slums versus the countryside, as urban clients had a wider choice of patrons whose behavior was 
somewhat more policed by the hegemonic party. Weingrod (1977) carefully distinguishes 
between the intricate social relationships linking patrons and clients in Sardinian villages prior to 
the fascist era, and the less personal, more short-term exchanges centered on campaign politics 
that accompanied the rise of the mass political party and greater state presence in society. Fox 
(1994) notes a shift from an “authoritarian clientelism” that relied on repression to a “semi-
clientelism” that could only use the threat of benefit removal to gain client cooperation, as the 
Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) gradually lost hegemonic power. And Gay’s 
(2006) “thin clientelism” describes the firmly anchored, but indirect, exchange logic that ruled 
the reaction of voters in a Brazilian slum to the state government’s universally implemented 
infrastructure programs. 
Other studies broadening the use of the term clientelism are driven by the desire for 
parsimony and have stripped the traditional definition of a series of characteristics to make it 
broadly applicable. Thus, Stokes (2007) labels clientelism “the proffering of material goods in 
return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did 
you (will you) support me?”. Piattoni (2001) wishes to modernize clientelism by defining it as a 
rational, interest maximizing exchange of votes or other forms of political support for benefits. 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) call it a “transaction, the direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in 
return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services”. 
Both approaches adhere to rules of concept formation, though they do so in different 
manners. The first set of researchers uses a traditional definition of clientelism as a central 
category, adding additional characteristics and removing others in creating radial categories that 
describe specific cases. This method is popular among ethnographers – researchers likely to 
search out detailed variations among particular instances of clientelism. The second group has 
more affinity with Sartori’s classical method, stripping clientelism of all but one, essential 
defining element in order to extend it to the level of a primary category applicable to a wide 
variety of cases. Individual cases that exhibit other characteristics in addition to the fundamental 
element exist at a secondary level of lower abstraction. Researchers using this method are 
usually interested in comparing numerous cases that fall broadly into the category of clientelism. 
Both approaches, and the goals for which they are used, have their merits. 
However, numerous case studies of clientelism neither employ an identifiable strategy for 
concept-building nor seek to strike a balance among the desirable elements for creating a good 
concept. These are generally highly interesting studies of informal political exchanges that have 
significant impact on the formally established rules and channels of democratic politics. They 
tend to describe exchanges that include votes, money and/or public resources and benefit at least 
one of the parties to the bargain in a manner described as undermining formal democratic 
processes. Candidates for public election buy votes; certain electoral districts benefit unfairly 
from public works programs based on their representatives’ bargaining power in various 
governmental fora; citizens bribe officials; governing parties bribe members of the opposition; 
friends and supporters receive jobs that they do not merit; citizens – individually or in groups – 
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and their patrons build lasting relationships in which they exchange all manner of goods and 
services; dissidents are economically or physically threatened; and some political parties or 
governments engage in all of these practices. All of this is described as clientelism. Despite the 
intrinsic value of these research contributions, their indiscriminate use of the term clientelism has 
voided the concept of descriptive power and makes it difficult to compare a case described in one 
study to that in another. 
One might defend the lumping together of vote-buying, pork-barreling, bribery, 
corruption, clientelism, patronage, friendship, violence and machine politics under the general 
heading of clientelism as fair due to family resemblance. That is, these phenomena resemble 
each other enough to fall into the same category, although none perfectly fits the categorical 
definition (Collier and Mahon 1993). The expected duration, diffuseness, participants and degree 
of contact between them, goods and/or services involved and the analytical level of the 
exchanges may differ. But, because they all involve a more or less sinister misappropriation of 
public goods and misuse of representation that should be democratic, they are of one family. 
This position might be more appropriate if the family were corruption than if it is 
clientelism, since the former better denominates the common ‘aura’ (since family resemblance 
denies the necessity of a shared characteristic) than the latter. Regardless, other problems 
complicate the argument. The definition of corruption is as, if not more, fraught as that of 
clientelism (Philp 1997). Machine politics occurs at a higher level of analysis than individual 
bargains such as vote-buying and friendship. Not least, clientelism can have certain democratic 
aspects that would make it rather a black sheep (Hilgers 2009). 
In sum, a good deal of the contemporary literature does not engage with many of the 
elements necessary to creating a good concept of clientelism (see Gerring 1999). Though 
clientelism, as it is often used, appears intuitively familiar and briefly definable (as an unfair and 
anti-democratic political exchange) it is neither deep nor externally differentiated. It does not 
have enough specific properties to render it useful for conveying much with the simple use of its 
name (depth), nor is it well-bounded enough to clearly differentiate it from surrounding concepts. 
Clientelism has become so blurred as to be haphazardly interchangeable with something as brief 
and operationally straightforward as a candidate paying a citizen a certain amount of cash on 
election day for his vote and something as durable and complex as the Christian Democratic 
Party’s political control in southern Italy. As a result, it is both difficult to operationalize 
clientelism and to use it for theory-building. 
Putting clientelism in its place – definitionally and analytically 
To be sure, the essential characteristic of clientelism is the interest-maximizing exchange 
of resources for political support – the characteristic that is identified by researchers, such as 
Piattoni (2001), influenced by rational choice and aiming for broad comparison. However, there 
are several accompanying, defining elements that add depth to this definition and that allow its 
differentiation from neighboring concepts: longevity, diffuseness, face-to-face contact and status 
inequality. Clientelism is not only an exchange, but also a personal relationship. It is not one 
transaction, fixed in time, but a series of interactions that play out over time and involve a range 
of goods and services traded between two parties who develop trust in each other’s commitment. 
It is not an egalitarian bargain, but one that hinges on power and the lack thereof, as two persons 
of unequal status negotiate the rules of engagement. 
That clientelism is a personal relationship is significant in that it allows for differentiation 
from other types of exchanges. This, in turn, circumscribes the analytical level at which the 
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concept has descriptive power. The clientelistic relationship functions at the lowest analytical 
level of individual political actors. At the meso and macro levels, organizations and states or 
systems may contain clientelistic relationships, but they should not be described as clientelistic 
per se. 
  At the same time, although the type of organization and/or system in which a clientelistic 
relationship is found affects its dynamics, the essential characteristics of the relationship remain 
constant. System and organization, as well as the patron's role within these, bear on the relative 
degrees of power of the parties involved in clientelism. Competition among patrons for clients – 
in selection or election for public or private office or in efforts to increase private socio-
economic standing – gives clients a choice among patrons and, therefore, greater bargaining 
power. Where democratic processes exist, would-be clients may also have opportunities to access 
resources through publicly regulated procedures, increasing the price of their loyalty to a patron. 
However, where patrons are sparse and/or form a hermetic class and few or no alternatives for 
accessing resources exist, clients have less power to negotiate.1 Notwithstanding its democratic 
or authoritarian, electoral or administrative, public or private arena, the defining characteristics 
of clientelism do not change. In all cases, the relationship involves a series of face-to-face 
exchanges in which the person of greater status gains power through elements such as the vote, 
favors owed, or loyalty, and the person of lesser status gains special treatment or resources that 
are not readily available to everyone in the same, or similar, positions. In sum, 1) the concept of 
clientelism is analytically confined to the microsociological domain, and 2) the power 
differential in any one clientelistic relationship is affected by the systems, structures, and 
institutions in which it is embedded, but 3) the nature of these higher levels of analysis does not 
alter the essential characteristics of clientelism.  This constant is what allows us to compare 
across time and space. It is what gives the concept descriptive power. 
Relationship level 
At the microsociological level of analysis, individuals interact based on expectations of 
others’ conduct. For Weber (1978), social relationships are constituted of actors behaving toward 
and with each other. He categorizes social action as carried out rationally to meet goals that are 
subjectively useful (instrumental) or valued for their own sake, or as carried out without 
calculation for emotional (affectual) or traditional reasons. Homans (1958) adds that all social 
behaviour is rooted in an exchange of goods, information, affection, approval, and/or prestige 
that either reaches equilibrium, as the individuals adjust the amount they give according to the 
perceived costs and benefits, or lapses, if one or both parties view it as too costly. This is not to 
say that individual action and interaction occurs in a vacuum. The microsociological is intimately 
interlinked with the meso and macrosociological levels (Giddens 1986); thus, we see a 
continuum of clientelism that includes repressive and participatory variations depending on 
systemic characteristics. Among the political relationships broadly labeled as clientelism in the 
literature, we find a variety of individual exchange-based relationships. Some are easily 
identifiable as instrumentally rational and short-lived, while others cross the lines among 
instrumental, value, emotional and traditional causes. 
The clientelistic exchange relationship is well-described by the landlord-peasant bond 
explained above, as well as by fictive kinship, such as the customary Latin American 
                                                 
1See Scott (1977: 125-26) for a discussion of the relative degrees of power of patron and client in 
traditional agrarian settings. 
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compadrazgo, which involves the choosing of a person with access to needed resources as 
godmother or father to one’s child, in view of creating a long-term bond (Mintz and Wolf 1977). 
Compadres are chosen strategically, but the bond is one aspect of the traditional relationship 
between individuals from different socioeconomic classes that calls upon the better-off to bestow 
some measure of goodwill upon those of lower status, simultaneously allowing them to enhance 
their prestige by gathering a loyal following. 
 Ties between local economic or political strongmen and citizens may also be 
clientelistic. Such relationships sometimes involve the channeling of public goods through 
private connections, when a public official or elected politician gives his clients preferential 
access to state resources. For example, a municipal mayor in Mexico City uses a political 
operator to organize senior citizens’ groups. The citizens attend the groups as a welcome change 
from their daily routines and they develop a relationship with the operator. They extol the 
operator’s virtues – she is a good organizer, an important and good person – and some are 
generally to be found accompanying her while she goes about her business in the neighborhood. 
In the group meetings, the citizens receive information about the mayor’s party and are asked to 
participate in events held by the party; if they participate faithfully, they receive food baskets 
from the municipality. The mayor and the operator use public goods to gather followers and use 
the groups to build their political capital, but they also feel some degree of responsibility for the 
welfare of “their” people (evidence from author’s fieldwork in Mexico City in 2004). In other 
cases, the goods distributed are private, emanating from the patron’s personal wealth or technical 
expertise. This occurs with India’s naya netas, new local leaders with better education and 
contacts to the outside world than other villagers, who gather loyal followers based on their 
political and economic knowledge (Krishna 2007). 
Clientelism should be seen as a continuum that may involve repression or relatively 
participatory exchanges between patrons and clients. The position of a particular relationship on 
the continuum depends on the sociopolitical context in which it occurs. For example, landlord-
peasant relationships in traditional societies or where state penetration of the countryside is 
limited sometimes include debt-bondage (Singelmann 1981), while community leaders in more 
competitive polities are held accountable for their actions by members (Gay 1999) and such 
relationships may even result in clients learning certain participatory skills (Hilgers 2008). 
Friendship is a personal exchange relationship that is akin to clientelism but not part of 
the clientelistic continuum due to the relative socio-economic or political status of both members 
to the bargain. In ancient Roman society, patrons – members of the wealthy, political elite – 
entered exchange-based relationships both with humble men of much lower status and with 
junior members of the elite. Patrons would not humiliate other members of the elite by referring 
to them as clients, preferring to call them friends and receiving them much more graciously than 
clients, although similar unwritten rules of obligation and deference applied (Gelzer 1969; Saller 
1982). Such friendship is also pervasive in the contemporary Chilean middle classes, where 
many people have friends in the civil service and continually exchange favours with them 
(Lomnitz 1988). The friends are members of the same class, but are in positions giving them 
access to different types of goods and services that can be traded without having to go through 
complicated official channels. Each friend thus has access to resources the other needs, while the 
patron-client relationship is marked by a one-way flow of resources from patron to client. Save 
for loyalty, the client has little to offer that the patron values. 
Clientelism, compadrazgo and friendship are instrumentally rational, but they also 
contain elements of emotion, tradition and value. Friends are bound to feel a certain degree of 
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affection for each other. In rarer cases this may be true for compadres or patrons and clients, 
though here affection – and traditional shows of respect and deference – are usually performed 
rather than genuine (Auyero 1999), masking profound feelings of mistrust and dislike between 
those who have power and those who do not (Scott 1985). The longevity, diffuseness and face-
to-face contact that mark clientelism and its related relationships – and the inequality that 
characterizes clientelism – set them apart from other exchanges. 
Patronage is closely linked to clientelism, although its key defining characteristic – the 
discretionary distribution of public office – is not necessarily shared by clientelism. Patronage 
entails the distribution of public sector jobs by a candidate or party to loyal supporters who have 
helped to generate votes. The votes in question are often produced through clientelism (Remmer 
2007). Thus, groups can be involved in exchange-based relationships through patronage: a patron 
develops individual links with a number of individuals, who are his clients. The patron also 
fosters ties with individuals of higher political status who confer favors upon him in return for 
the assurance that his followers will politically support the party in question. The patron thus 
becomes a broker or mediator (Weingrod 1977). Significantly, all of the relationships involved 
are individual: each client bargains with the patron and the patron negotiates with his contact in 
the party. I will further discuss the institutionalization of such relationships below. 
Although patronage and clientelism often appear together, the terms are not 
interchangeable. McCourt (2000) groups them with kinship and labels them a “moneyless form 
of corruption” that is present in public administrations the world over where various personal 
considerations undermine merit-based appointments. He suggests that such corruption can be 
successfully combated with institutions that clearly identify merit and regulate the filling of 
positions according to this definition. Notwithstanding the documented, conflictive coexistence 
of values supporting rational-legal institutions with values demanding traditional loyalties (see 
Lomnitz 1988 for the Chilean and Mexican cases), patching over the differences among the 
relationships identified does no favors to the search for mechanisms suitable for the development 
of professional bureaucracies. Institutional responses should likely emphasize particular 
characteristics depending on the type of exchange, tradition or corruption – based on family 
responsibilities, on infrastructural resource scarcity, on lack of judicial independence, etc. – that 
they are intended to address. 
Corruption is frequently equated with the relationships already defined, but should also 
remain a separate category.2 First, corruption is not necessarily exchange-based. Rigging 
elections and using public money to finance an incumbent’s campaign are examples of 
corruption, but do not involve reciprocity between two parties. Also, corruption, being “the 
violation of norms based on a distinction between what is public and what is private” (Hutchcroft 
1997), clearly involves public office and/or public resources, which is not always the case for 
exchange-based political relationships. Finally, several seminal works on corruption highlight the 
importance of attitudes in identifying what is or is not corrupt. The line between public and 
private is crossed when a public official does a favor in return for a pay-off from the recipient of 
the favor. However, whether and how corrupt the act is depends on the opinions – and therefore 
the political norms – of political elites or public officials and the public, who make their 
judgments based on the position of the individuals or groups involved, the nature of the favour, 
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and the amount and type of pay-off  (Peters and Welch 1978). The norms in question are context 
dependent: in some cultural and institutional settings the distinction between public and private 
is viewed differently than in others (Philp 1997). 
In settings marked by long-term resource shortages, participants perceive the practice of 
clientelism as a necessary and normal activity, not as a violation of politico-institutional norms. 
The practice is everyday politics engaged in regularly by citizens at large, while the term is a 
sensitive topic – the two are not mutually exclusive. For instance, Mexicans’ lives are marked by 
reciprocal exchanges between individuals of unequal status, yet these exchanges are rarely 
considered in terms of clientelism. At the same time, educated people in general and politicians 
and officials in particular associate clientelism with the authoritarian era and its ruling party’s 
undemocratic behavior. The exchanges are ubiquitous and many politicians will discuss them 
freely as a normal part of politics, but the word is seen as negative and no one wants to be 
perceived as clientelistic (author’s fieldwork, Mexico City 2004). 
In other cases, analysts misuse the terms. Thus, Avritzer (2006) labels as clientelistic the 
Brazilian ruling party’s use of a slush fund to pay for its electoral campaigns, a case that would 
be more appropriately labeled as corruption. Critics are also quick to signal as corrupt the 
Brazilian president’s appointment of thousands of public officials. Many of the important 
positions will inevitably go to trusted persons, but this patronage is the president’s legal right. 
Similarly, the Canadian prime minister has the traditional privilege of appointing members to the 
senate and tends to grant these positions to loyal party supporters. These are patronage positions, 
to be sure, and there is much debate about making the senate an elected body in order to render 
the system more representative, but whether the existing system constitutes corruption is a matter 
of interpretation. Thus, although certain instances of clientelism or patronage may be perceived 
as corrupt, it is best to maintain a definitional divide among the concepts and to evaluate 
coincidence between them on a case-by-case basis. 
 Also unlike clientelism and friendship, vote-buying is a one-shot, direct exchange, in 
which the participants have no particular characteristics other than that the recipient is a voter 
(Schaffer 2007). An individual citizen is given money, goods, or services shortly (hours or days) 
prior to an election in exchange for his or her vote. In the case of poor voters, this can involve 
providing transportation, entertainment, and/or a meal on an election day to individuals who 
would otherwise be working, and instructing these voters on how to mark their ballots. For 
instance, local Mexico City politicians hire buses to transport citizens to the polls (an operation 
known as acarreo), doing their best to ensure that the favor is returned (author’s fieldwork, 
Mexico City 2004). Schaffer (2004) lists the dollar amounts paid for votes in some East Asian 
elections, ranging from the equivalent of $0.60 US during community elections in a poor Manila 
neighborhood in 2002, to $60 US for middle class votes in a 2003 Taiwanese county by-election. 
Such one-shot bargaining is underwritten by a reciprocal, exchange-based logic, but is confined 
to a brief and impersonal contract that differs markedly from the diffuse relationship of 
clientelism. Vote-buying is more clearly confined to the Weberian category of instrumental 
rationality and follows Homans’ logic of termination due to excessive cost, since politicians 
cannot finance a continuous buying of loyalty. 
 The conceptual differentiation between vote-buying and clientelism is empirically 
grounded. As Stokes (2005, 2007) demonstrates, any such exchange involves a commitment 
issue. Both patron and client want to be relatively certain that the other party will uphold his end 
of the bargain. However, when the exchange is one-shot, it is logically preferable for both sides 




vote his conscience, and for the candidate to make a promise in exchange for the vote and break 
the promise upon winning the election. When the link is face-to-face and long-term, on the other 
hand, the participants become part of a social network within which they and their habits and 
behaviors are known. For Stokes, this results in a “perverse accountability” through which local 
party operatives are able to monitor voter behavior despite the secret ballot. The monitoring can, 
in fact, go both ways, as the voting members of the network also exchange information regarding 
the reliability of candidates and are able to sanction those who break their promises or make 
overly onerous demands in subsequent exchange rounds (Hilgers 2009).3 The longevity of the 
clientelistic relationship facilitates accountability, however perverse, and provides much higher 
incentives for compliance than vote-buying. Nonetheless, there may be some overlap between 
the two, where the buying of votes is limited to electoral periods but occurs over several 
elections and between known players – familiar party candidates or brokers and a community 
with identifiable members. While such exchanges resemble vote-buying more than clientelism 
since they are not diffuse and not necessarily face-to-face or between people of unequal status, 
they do include the repetition that defines clientelism. 
Despite their differences, clientelism and vote-buying are often used interchangeably. 
Wang and Kurzman (2007) argue that clientelism is not as effective as generally assumed, since 
clients often do not comply with their patrons’ political directives. However, the literature they 
review is one that assumes durable and diffuse clientelistic relationships, while the case they test 
is one in which political operators bought votes on the eve of the 1993 Taiwanese election. It 
may well be that clientelism often fails to produce the desired votes, but a study of vote-buying 
cannot test this hypothesis. Gay’s (1999) insightful work on politics in a Brazilian favela 
portrays the relationship between a community leader and a series of candidates for political 
office as clientelistic. Yet, the deals struck between the two parties were confined to the period 
immediately preceding an election: the politician in question saw to the paving of the 
neighborhood’s streets or provided funding for a local project and in return the president 
instructed his community to vote for the politician. There were no long-term arrangements with a 
single politician in which it was understood that electoral support would be forthcoming for all 
of the favors done by the politician over the interim period. Instead, every election was 
negotiated and support went to the highest bidder. To be sure, the relationship between the 
community members and their president may have been clientelistic, but this is not the crux of 
Gay’s argument. 
Pork-barreling is also often conflated with clientelism. Here, politicians act according to 
electoral motivations rather than for the greater good by promoting distributive policies that will 
benefit their own districts, but whose costs are carried by the entire electorate (Ricci 2003). 
Regardless of which politician they support, everyone in the receiving constituency benefits from 
the policy, making the relationship neither personal nor dependent on the recipient’s reciprocal 
actions and, therefore, not clientelistic. Of course, if the politician is not reelected, she will not 
continue to pass goodies the way of her district – though her successor may – but the same is true 
of any type of targeted program, even those that are ideologically motivated. While pork-
barreling is often present in conjunction with clientelism, the two are not the same. 
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In a unique field experiment conducted during Benin’s 2001 election, Wantchekon (2003) 
worked with the presidential candidates’ campaign managers to present some villages with 
public policy platforms and others with what he calls clientelist platforms. Both platforms 
included health, education and infrastructure issues, but the one labeled as clientelistic presented 
the issues as local projects, while the policy platform described them as national ones. The most 
immediate problem here is that a political platform necessarily lays out some type of program for 
the electorate at large; this is not an exchange relationship that evolves over time and a series of 
transactions. Of course voters must support the candidate presenting the platform in order to 
benefit from his program, but this is also the case with ideological programs. The platforms 
presented by Wantchekon would be more appropriately labeled pork, than clientelist. 
Wantchekon found that the pork platform was most effective in areas controlled by regional 
parties and he hypothesizes that this may have been because national-level opposition parties are 
more credible on public policy. However, in an argument parallel to Wantchekon’s hypothesis, 
this could be where clientelism actually does play a role, since regional party politicians are more 
likely to have developed durable relationships in their local strongholds with clients that are 
receptive to the promises of pork as part and parcel of a preexisting exchange logic. 
In sum, clientelism operates as a personal relationship at the microsociological level, 
along with a series of other phenomena that are either related to it or that often occur in 
conjunction with it, and whose definitional distinction is important for identifying the forces at 
work. Clientelistic relationships are often found in social and political organizations, but exist 
here alongside other types of links, not all of which are personal, exchanges, or relationships. 
Organizational level 
 At the mesosociological level, we find organizations. According to Weber (1978), these 
are bodies with restricted access constituted of social relationships and functioning according to 
rules implemented by an executive. While this is a straightforward definition, it refers to 
relatively complex entities ranging from compact units with few members to large groups. 
Important bodies of literature in the social and natural sciences as well as in the humanities study 
organizations of all types and sizes – the types of relationships they contain, their effects on 
members and on surrounding societies and environments (and the reverse) and so on. Business 
and management studies include extensive theories on the causes and consequences of 
organizational behavior and interaction, with an important subfield on informal group cultures 
that are said to orient organizational action as much as formal rules (Schein 2004). 
 Notwithstanding the conceptual inaccuracy of ascribing an interpersonal relationship to 
an entity, it would be difficult, given the complexity of ‘organization’, to find an organization 
that is strictly clientelistic. To be sure, there exist organizations whose central social relationships 
are clientelistic, but even these either begin with other functions or come to contain other 
relationships and have other aims almost as soon as they come into existence. For example, a 
political operator I met in Mexico City in 2004 was contacted by a group of homeowners for 
help with applying for a government subsidy to renovate their building, whose structure had been 
affected by an earthquake. He agreed to work for them if they would regularly meet with him to 
hear his political teachings and attend events organized by his party. As much as the relationship 
between the individual group members and the operator was clientelistic, the organization had 
two other important characteristics: the members had already banded together in order to access 
funding before contacting the operator, and their interaction with him taught them a set of 




situations. In another example, the Frente Popular Francisco Villa (Francisco Villa Popular Front, 
FPFV) is notorious in Mexico City for its clientelistic strategies. FPFV leaders exchange political 
support for help in accessing social housing credits with the urban poor and use their followers as 
leverage in negotiations for public sector jobs, political candidacies, and public resources with 
the Federal District government. Yet, the organization also has an independent political purpose 
that often leads it to publicly clash with the government, and it includes a number of 
communities – squatters and formally established – with all the ins and outs of people living 
together in close quarters and having to organize themselves to access electricity, potable water, 
and other public goods and services (author’s fieldwork, Mexico City 2004). Both the small and 
the large organization contain clientelistic relationships, but are more complex in their internal 
workings and their external effects than what is conveyed by the clientelistic label. 
 Within these organizations, we also find another empirical reason to conceptually limit 
the patron-client relationship to one between two individuals: rewards are based on individual 
compliance. Although an organization may receive what appear to be collective goods from a 
party, candidate, or government official when the patron responsible for the members of the 
organization delivers their votes, access to the goods is carefully divided among clients based on 
individual diligence in fulfilling the bargain. Thus, FPFV patrons carefully record client 
participation in all manner of political and community events and, when the organization is 
awarded a social housing project by the government, its most assiduous clients receive the 
choicest apartments. Returning to Susan Stokes' (2005) logic, incentives must be selective in 
order for clientelism not to be undermined by free-rider problems.   
 There is, thus, a group element in clientelistic politics when an organization's strategies 
for goal attainment involve building patron-client relationships and patrons use their clientelistic 
following to make bargains at higher echelons of the political hierarchy. Researchers often talk of 
such patrons as brokers – people who have organizational and leadership skills but lack access to 
distributable resources and therefore use their abilities to act as middlemen between clients and 
higher levels of power (see Scott 1977). While clientelism remains a personal relationship that is 
viable because patrons and clients make individually supervisable bargains based on selective 
incentives, the relationships and the parties to them are socially embedded, linking together in 
various ways to form networks and pyramids.4 
 Much as the FPFV and other such organizations, political machines are also more 
complex than what is allowed by the term clientelism, despite the general tendency to use it and 
machine politics interchangeably. Mills Ivins’ (1887) discussion of several United States District 
Assemblies – including the infamous Tammany Hall of New York – describes a political machine 
as an organization with highly centralized power that engages in corruption, violence, patronage, 
the sale of public office, clientelism and bribery, that gains control of newspapers and fosters 
links – or even control of – the police and the judiciary. Chubb (1982) also provides an excellent 
study of a political machine, in her work on the Italian Christian Democratic Party’s chaotic rule 
in Southern Italy and its links with the urban poor, the middle classes, business and the mafia. 
Although the machine was characterized by the gamut of characteristics listed above and is 
clearly a higher-level category than individual exchange relationships, Chubb subsumes all of its 
activities under the general heading of clientelism. More recently, Stokes (2005), in an article 
resulting from her extensive research into exchange-based political relationships in Argentine 
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politics, employs the terms machine politics, clientelism, and vote-buying as relatively 
synonymous, missing an opportunity for using her evidence to illustrate the differences among 
them. 
At the mesosociological level, we also find corporatist organizations.5 As discussed 
above, groups can be linked into exchange-based relationships through brokers. Where links 
between groups and the state are institutionalized, however, they should be referred to as 
corporatist. Corporatism is a system of interest intermediation, where a strong democratic or 
authoritarian state and functionally organized interest groups negotiate policy. In return for 
guaranteed representation in the policy-making sphere, the groups aid in policy application 
(Adams 2005). Corporatism and clientelism often appear together, particularly in authoritarian 
systems where politicians and corporatist leaders foster clienteles in order to increase their 
personal prestige and to ensure rank-and-file quiescence through the hope of access to 
discretionally distributed goods and services (Middlebrook 1995). Again, the clientelistic links 
exist at the individual level and, although they are a prominent feature of some corporatist 
organizations, the organizations are more complex than these relationships. 
State or system level 
At the macrosociological level, we find societies, social systems and the state. These are 
large social entities that contain a series of groups and organizations and a multitude of 
individuals, but whose character is more than the sum of its parts (Lehman 1978). The problem 
of complexity already seen at the mesosociological level thus applies here to an even greater 
extent: the dynamics of systems and states are not reducible to the relationship that is clientelism. 
While various socio-political systems contain clientelistic links, the broader character of the 
system affects the particular dynamics of the clientelistic relationships and the former cannot be 
reduced to the latter. 
To be sure, some social systems are identified by characteristics similar to those exhibited 
by clientelism. Patrimonial regimes are described as being marked by rulers and officials who 
regard their offices as private property, act in order to preserve their own benefits, and govern by 
distributing resources as personal favours to loyal followers (Weber 1978; Sandbrook with 
Barker 1985). These systems are said to function only as long as enough goods and services flow 
through personal networks to satisfy the receiving individuals and groups (Eisenstadt 1973). 
However, the historical sociologists using these descriptions place the systems they discuss in a 
detailed historical narrative explaining regime origins, internal organizations and hierarchies, 
center-periphery relations, and so on. They neither use their definition lightly, nor do they apply 
it interchangeably: patrimonialism contains clientelism, but the latter operates at a lower level of 
analysis and is only one of the patrimonial regime’s characteristics. Sandbrook’s (1985) 
discussion of the political reasons that compound the structural roots of Africa’s economic 
stagnation is revealing in this sense. 
According to Sandbrook, Africa is hampered by its colonial past, dependency, poor 
natural resources, a harsh tropical climate, a largely peasant population, small markets, lack of 
administrative and technical skill, ethnic and religious conflict and inequity in the international 
economy. In this context, he argues, the population is not politically active and the public sector 
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is not necessarily loyal, making personalism (a type of patrimonialism) the most effective type of 
rule. Sandbrook describes personal rule as turning on a strongman – usually the president – who 
is the center of the state’s political life, surrounds himself with loyal followers who may be hired 
and fired at will, forces respect of his person and image, and creates a system of administrative 
and economic corruption that can only result in economic decline. To attain and maintain power, 
the strongman uses a personally loyal armed force, to threaten and enact repression, and 
clientelism, by establishing links with patrons at regional and local levels, in the bureaucracy, in 
trade unions and in other organizations. However, as Sandbrook is careful to point out, not all 
personal regimes are the same and the degree of political competition affects the spread of 
clientelistic spoils. The more authoritarian the system, the more client acquiescence is forced 
through repression, while competition ensures that benefits are passed to the masses (Sandbrook 
1985: 93-4). 
Indeed, clientelism not only occurs in more or less competitive patrimonial systems but 
also in systems that feature – and function, to some degree, according to – institutionalized 
regulations. Personal exchanges are not essential to the survival of the sociopolitical regime in 
neopatrimonial systems, which have extensive administrative structures and laws regulating the 
bureaucracy as well as the distribution of resources. Nonetheless, personalistic elements persist, 
with central officials concentrating power, seeking rents, and making little effort to develop the 
periphery, but gathering support among peripheral groups and easing these groups’ access to the 
administration through clientelistic mechanisms (Eisenstadt 1973; Erdmann and Engel 2006). 
According to Bratton and van de Walle (1997), a neopatrimonial regime is one in which 
bureaucratic institutions function based on personal relationships and where officials use 
clientelism to ensure political order. Despite this assertion, Bratton and van de Walle do not use 
the term clientelism to describe neopatrimonialism as a whole. They list personal exchanges, 
clientelism and corruption as separate elements and explain variations in competition and 
participation among neopatrimonial regimes, which motivate different degrees of patron 
responsiveness to clients (Ibid., 62, 68-82). 
In a discussion of formal and informal institutions in Egyptian politics, Koehler (2008) 
also identifies clientelism as only one among several elements important to the make-up of the 
country’s neopatrimonial regime. Describing Egypt’s formal institutions, he writes that executive 
and legislative powers are constitutionally mandated, elections are held regularly and according 
to electoral laws, and opposition parties are licensed and governed by a parliamentary 
committee. However, Koehler also explains that these formal mechanisms and a set of informal 
rules permeate each other. Thus, most legislation emanates from a very powerful executive and is 
accepted with little discussion by the legislature, the ruling party dominates the committee 
regulating opposition parties, electoral laws are often rewritten prior to elections, and electoral 
fraud is common. The regime essentially uses elections to legitimate itself and to co-opt 
opposition elements. Since legislators have little policy-making power but still have to get 
elected and voters know it, they are motivated to establish clientelistic relationships with each 
other. As much as Koehler argues that links between Egyptian politicians and voters are 
thoroughly clientelistic, he clearly traces this phenomenon to broader institutional causes that are 
as important to the Egyptian system as clientelism. 
In contrast to the examples of contextualized, microsociological clientelism described 
above, some authors apply the concept at the systemic level. Berman (1974) analyzes African 
political development using an ideal-typical “clientelistic system” in which neocolonial 




peripheries to centers, voters to politicians, and citizens to holders of public and private office in 
hierarchies that culminate in powerful central patrons. He describes the feudal, personalistic 
character of internal center-periphery relations as shaped by neocolonial pressures from above 
and clientelistic pressures from below, taking particular pains to explain the import of the latter. 
While Berman’s analysis provided an interesting alternative to mainstream perspectives 
on African development at the time of publication, it lacks the clarity and impact of similar 
analyses by Eisenstadt and Sandbrook, who used patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism to 
explain system-level characteristics and kept clientelism at a lower order. In using clientelism to 
describe a particular type of political system, Berman has to define it as a relationship of 
domination, used by the elite to subjugate the masses and maintain the status quo – a definition 
that does not travel well, since the dynamics of clientelism change with contextual factors (see 
Cornelius 1977; Fox 1994; Gay 1999). In addition, Berman’s discussion of the nexus between 
neocolonial and clientelistic structures is imprecise, as the feudalism and personalism of internal 
center-periphery relations appear more clearly caused by macrostructural than by 
microsociological factors. Patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism, on the other hand, clearly 
subsume such internal structures – alongside the interpersonal exchange relationships of 
clientelism. 
The problems encountered in Berman’s application of clientelism to the system level 
continue elsewhere. Scheiner (2007) also uses the term “clientelistic system”, but applies it to 
Japanese politics.  He argues that institutional and structural factors – including the electoral 
system, mobilization for early political parties, and land tenure systems – have led politicians of 
the country’s most powerful, and longtime ruling, political party (the Liberal Democratic Party, 
LDP) to construct clientelistic linkages with voters through groups based on personal support or 
on economic and industrial sectors (particularly those unable to survive on their own in a 
competitive market). While Scheiner does contextualize clientelism, his analysis contains several 
imprecisions: he labels as clientelistic relations between the LDP and economic sectors that 
would be better described as corporatism, counterposes democracy to what he calls Japan’s 
clientelistic system without clarifying whether this means Japan is undemocratic, and does not 
define his clientelistic system, leaving the reader unsure as to what a system is meant to be. A 
broader problem is that we are presented with the “clientelistic systems” of Africa and Japan, that 
appear to have little in common empirically or theoretically, let alone with – for example – 
Randeraad and Wolffram’s (2001) description of the 17th century Dutch Republic as a 
clientelistic system, in which the prince used clientelism to collect taxes and gather political 
support. 
This is not to say that patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism are superior terms because 
they are clearly connected with a particular regime type or historical era. Although both tend to 
be associated with authoritarianism and rational-legal systems with democracy, this is not 
necessarily the case. Erdmann and Engel (2006) remind us that late nineteenth century Germany 
was essentially a rational-legal system, though certainly not a democracy. Conversely, a series of 
contemporary states – such as Nicaragua, Guatemala, Bangladesh, and Ukraine – fall into a 
“gray zone” that includes democratic and neopatrimonial characteristics (Carothers 2002). 
Regardless, patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism are specified forms of government and the 
concepts are intended for the systemic level, whereas clientelism clearly is neither. 
Further underscoring the point that systems are only awkwardly labeled as clientelistic is 
evidence that clientelism and patronage exist in rational-legal systems, the definitional antithesis 




public good, where officials are chosen based on merit and are in office to do a particular job 
according to established rules and norms (Weber 1978). Sweden may be one of the best cases of 
a professionalized bureaucracy: the concepts of clientelism and patronage do not appear in any of 
the major analyses of Swedish politics and some researchers are actually concerned with the 
opposite problem of too much administrative impersonalism. Nonetheless, there are cases of 
recruitment based on ideological commitment, class or family ties, although these are explained 
in terms of efficiency or socialization (Papakostas 2001). In another example, Chicago’s 
Democratic political machine features clientelistic relationships between precinct captains and 
voters, who exchange all manner of permits, favours and special treatment for political support 
(Clark 1994). However, the competitive American rational-legal system provides recourse to 
those unwilling to enter such relationships, an alternative not always available in other political 
systems. In both Sweden and the United States, the context of political competition, bureaucratic 
professionalism and judicial independence create a much more democratic clientelism than that 
found in an authoritarian neopatrimonial system such as Egypt. Given clientelism’s dependence 
on broader systemic factors, its application to systems remains an uneasy fit. 
Conclusion 
To recapitulate, making a good concept of clientelism requires differentiating it from 
neighbouring concepts, which is possible by emphasizing several characteristics beyond the core 
element of interest-maximizing exchange: longevity, diffuseness, face-to-face contact and 
inequality. The power relations at play in microsociological clientelistic exchanges vary from 
repressive to participatory, a continuum that is affected by the degree of competition and 
participation present in the context in which clientelism occurs. Given this contextual 
dependence, and the complexity of organizations and systems operating at higher analytical 
levels, transplanting the micro-term to the meso or macro level is problematic. 
In arguing that the micro and macro levels are interlinked, I have referred to Giddens 
(1986). In the present article, this has been a one-way explanation of structure affecting 
individual action; an argument made in order to highlight the idea that our concept should be 
restricted to the lower analytical level. Giddens, of course, sees the interlinkage as clearly 
bidirectional: individual action also affects the context. In a discussion aimed directly at 
clientelism, Graziano (1983) also stresses that the microsociological level needs to be linked 
meaningfully to broader structures and that this should occur through a theory demonstrating the 
interaction between the characteristics of the relationship and those of the greater society. 
Graziano emphasizes the manipulation and coercion that are often part of clientelism and calls 
for research into the links between clientelism, generalized inequality and class analysis. This 
certainly merits further study – since inequality is one of clientelism’s defining characteristics, it 
follows that the link between clientelism and its politico-economic context is both more subtle 
and more portentous than what is conveyed by my unadorned statement that the relationship is 
affected by its context. However, such a quest for theory need not be unidirectional. Interesting 
work has been done on the constructive value of clientelism in broader organizations and 
institutions in competitive, but weakly institutionalized, democratic polities (Gay 1999 and 2006; 
Hilgers 2009; Krishna 2007) evidence that also warrants further consideration. Indeed, should 
this evidence hold true, it could lead to fascinating policy-based questions: how does clientelism 
work where democratic institutions fail? What does it do that the formal institutions do not? 




Theories of the behavioral-structural interactions between clientelism and its context will 
also benefit from a clearly differentiated concept of clientelism, which will facilitate the 
recognition of significant changes across time, as well as across and within political systems. 
Reviews of the literature on clientelism often refer to the divide between an anthropological 
clientelism describing traditional relationships in the countryside and a political science one 
referring to the impersonal and short-term electoral bargains between mass-parties and voters 
(see, for example, Weingrod 1977). As much as this disciplinary divide exists, using it to explain 
away multiple definitions of one concept is not helpful, since the empirical foundations of both 
perspectives exist in the real world and do not confine their effects to disciplinary topics of 
interest. Clientelism, vote-buying, pork-barreling and other such phenomena at some times 
appear together and at other times do not. Differentiating among them allows for study of shifts 
from one to another or of types of co-existence across cases, evidence that may be of 
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